The increasing use of biometrics has given rise to new privacy concerns. Biometric 
Introduction
In the past decade, there has been an increasing interest in the use of biometrics as keys to encrypt private data. Biometric encryption has similar advantages and disadvantages as traditional biometric recognition for user authentication and identification: conveniently, a user always carries his biometric with him, hence he cannot forget or loose his encryption keys; however, at the same time the encryption system must cope with changing keys because biometrics are inherently "noisy". Early work ( [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] ) has focussed on the problem of hiding data encrypted under biometrics and, more specifically, on the extraction of stable, uniform bitstrings that can be used as encryption keys. (FP7/2007 (FP7/ -2013 under grant agreement nb. ICT-2007-216339. So far, however, too little attention has been paid to biometric privacy. Our work addresses the question whether one can undermine a user's privacy given access to biometrically encrypted documents. More in particular, we examine if, given two biometrically encrypted files, an attacker can determine whether they were encrypted using the same biometric. This question is interesting in practice because biometrics are considered to be unique and can be used as an identifier to link a user's data from different applications for profiling or to trace his whereabouts. Moreover, biometric encryption is becoming an important component in biometric authentication systems. Instead of comparing a new measurement of the user's biometric with a reference measurement, called the template, that was stored during a registration process, the user now authenticates himself by proving knowledge of the biometric key. The system only has to store some biometrically encrypted value, which we call the protected template, as a (public) reference to the biometric key. In this way, biometric encryption is becoming an important means to protect biometric templates and the user's privacy.
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In this paper we present attacks on biometric encryption systems that are used for biometric template protection and we will further refer to these systems as template protection schemes. These schemes can be modeled as fuzzy sketches as defined in the fuzzy extractor framework [4] . The fuzzy sketch model provides a strong security property. A fuzzy sketch allows errors in its input, at the cost of a reduction in entropy, i.e., the sketch leaks information about the biometric. However, it guarantees that this reduction is limited; even if an adversary is able to recover L bits about the original biometric measurement, the biometric is still hard to predict.
We define new and stronger attack models that take into consideration realistic ways in which biometric systems could be deployed. First, it is conceivable that different organizations may decide to use the same template protection scheme. In this case, the user's biometric is measured and stored several times. Since each measurement is slightly different, and since a fuzzy sketch involves probabilistic choices, a new concern is that the various protected templates, when analyzed together, might leak extra informa-tion about the user's biometric. We therefore introduce a model in which an adversary is able to acquire different sketches (computed using the same algorithm) of the same biometric. We demonstrate that protected templates can still be compared to determine whether they come from the same biometric. However, this does not necessarily imply that the biometric (or biometrically encrypted) data is compromised. In a second model, we consider the situation in which the adversary is given fuzzy sketches of the same biometric, but this time, each sketch is computed using a different scheme. We show that in some cases protected templates can be completely reversed.
Biometrics and Privacy
Privacy risks in biometric systems have been expressed repeatedly in the literature, e.g., by Davida et al. [5] and by Prabhakar et al. [6] . First of all, biometric data are personal and might reveal sensitive information, such as ethnic origin, kinship, gender, or diseases a human being is suffering from. For example, it was suggested that there is a correlation between schizophrenia and specific fingerprint patterns [7] . Also, a large fraction of persons with Down syndrome has a ring of iris speckles, called Brushfield spots [8] . Although often challenged and sometimes very speculative, this kind of results indicates a potential exposure of sensitive information in current biometric systems. Some of this information is already discarded when samples are processed and templates are generated, however, it is often not clear how much information still resides in the templates.
A second privacy issue follows from a property which is desired for verification and identification, namely, uniqueness. A biometric sample, or a template derived from it, uniquely identifies a person within a certain set, with some error margin, and thus allows re-identification (or deanonymization), i.e., one can determine whether a person is registered in a particular application or not. It also enables profiling by using the biometric data as an index to collect data from different applications or databases.
A third concern, often presented as a security issue instead of a privacy problem, is the risk of impersonation. Although many biometric characteristics are considered public, access to biometric templates should be controlled to prevent that an adversary reconstructs, from a template, a fake sample that would pass a verification test. We partially address this issue and focus mainly on the issue of using biometric data as unique identifier.
Biometric Template Protection
When a biometric property is measured, e.g., by taking an image of a finger or face, characteristic features are extracted from the captured data and quantized. In each measurement these features are slightly different. Because these features have a particular distribution, biometrics, i.e., a feature or a combination of features (called the template), are modeled as random variables. If a template protection mechanism works on the features after quantization, biometrics are considered as discrete variables, otherwise as continuous variables.
Because two biometric measurements are never exactly the same, traditional cryptographic techniques that hide private data, e.g., password hashing or encryption, cannot be applied. The difference between two measurements of the same characteristic is considered as noise. Biometric template protection schemes are designed to eliminate this noise, while preserving the privacy of the input. They aim to fulfill two requirements in their attempt to deal with the problems mentioned above. Firstly, they transform the template 1 in a way that is hard to invert, hence an adversary cannot extract sensitive information or construct a fake sample from it. Secondly, they also aim to diversify the transformation to prevent recognition of different protected templates, originating from the same characteristic of the same person. We call these two properties irreversibility and indistinguishability. Other properties are often desired as well, e.g., collision-resistance to prevent impersonation, but we only consider the first two. As we do not know how much sensitive information is propagated in biometric templates we cannot make any claims about how well template protection schemes hide this residual information. Therefore, irreversibility will refer to the difficulty of determining (any information on) the original input.
The protection of biometric or noisy data has been formalized by Linnartz and Tuyls [3] who considered biometrics as continuous variables and by Dodis et al. [4] who treat them as discrete variables in their definitions for fuzzy extractors and fuzzy sketches. Unfortunately, it was shown by Smith [11] that due to the noisy nature of its input, a fuzzy sketch (or extractor) must always leak some information about its input (see also [12] ). This was also shown in [3] for the continuous case. It is this information leakage and the privacy risks explained above that motivate us to reconsider biometric sketches that are used multiple times.
Scope and Attack Model
The security of fuzzy sketches or fuzzy extractors that are applied more than once on the same noisy input has been studied by Boyen in his work on reusable fuzzy extractors [13] where notions of security against outsider and insider chosen perturbation attacks were defined. Our security notions model a much weaker adversary, yet we show that 1 . Some schemes can be applied directly to existing templates, e.g., fuzzy commitment on iriscodes [9] , whereas others are applied on a sample directly, e.g., cancellable biometrics on fingerprints [10] , or somewhere in between, e.g., fuzzy vault on minutiae [2] . We abstract from the input and use the term sample to indicate some biometric input, unless confusion may occur. some sketches based on linear codes, such as the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [1] , cannot be securely reused when considering biometric privacy.
Our attack model assumes an adversary who has obtained a set of sketches, e.g., a set of protected biometric templates from different databases or tokens, that are possibly related. Related sketches are defined as sketches that originate from the same noisy input, e.g., the same characteristic of the same person. Two samples of the same input, e.g., fingerprints of the same finger, may be so different that they appear to be unrelated. Because the quality of the data captured during enrolment is relatively high we limit our definition of related sketches to sketches that were generated from samples that are similar enough to be recognized by the schemes we are analyzing. The objective of the adversary is to identify related sketches and to derive more information from two or more related sketches than a single sketch would theoretically disclose.
The problem of identifying related sketches is an instantiation of the key-privacy problem as presented by Bellare et al. [14] . Loosely put, the attack model in [14] assumes an adversary who wants to know which key from a set of public keys was used to create a given ciphertext. This property provides anonymity to the user for whom the ciphertext is intended. In the context of biometrics, the sketches are the ciphertexts and the biometric data are the underlying (private) keys. Because biometrics are noisy the sketches have to leak information about their input. It is the objective of this paper to formally analyze how the information that is leaked from multiple sketches can be combined and exploited by an attacker.
Contributions and Organization
In this paper we achieve the following results. We define notions of security against distinguishability and reversibility attacks on biometric sketches. Indistinguishability attacks refer to an adversary who tries to use the (protected) template as a unique identifier to link, potentially sensitive, information from different applications. E.g. an employer who registers its employees' fingerprints can try to use these to retrieve information from an (external) anonymized database. Reversibility attacks refer to an adversary who acquires multiple sketches from the same biometric. For example, if a person's biometric is registered with two companies that are acquired by a third company where the person's biometric is also registered, then the third company suddenly has access to three protected templates of the same biometric. Our notions model a weak adversary, yet they provide the minimal privacy requirements to justify reusing biometric template protection schemes in multiple applications or to justify storing templates in a central database.
We analyze two types of fuzzy sketches that are based on code-offsets (linear shifts) and bit-permutations, respectively. In the first case we demonstrate how an adversary can exploit the linearity of the underlying error-correcting code to compare two sketches. In the second case we exploit the probabilistic nature of the fuzzy sketch to classify related and unrelated sketches. We conclude that the code-offset sketch and the bit-permutation sketch are not secure under our notions of indistinguishability and irreversibility. For example, given a database of about one million templates that are protected with the code-offset schemes proposed in [15] or [16] , an adversary can distinguish a related template from the rest with probability very close to 1. A similar result is given for a bit-permutation sketch. We also show that code-offset sketches can easily be reversed to the original sample from which they were derived, if two different codes are used on the same sample. For bitpermutation sketches this even holds for sketches using the same code.
Furthermore, bounds are determined on the leakage of information that can be used to distinguish templates in the code-offset construction and we give a necessary condition for perfect indistinguishability that holds for any fuzzy sketch: any sketch that leaks more information than needed to handle the errors in its input, cannot be perfectly indistinguishable.
Section 2 summarizes some aspects of coding theory and fuzzy sketches. In Section 3 we define our notions of sketch indistinguishability and sketch irreversibility. The notions are then applied on the code-offset construction in Sections 4.1 and 5.1 and on the bit-permutation sketch in Sections 4.2 and 5.2. Bounds on the sketch indistinguishability of the code-offset construction are given in Section 4.1, which, together with the indistinguishability results of the bit-permutation sketch in Section 4.2, lead to a condition for perfect indistinguishability in Section 4.3. An improved code-offset sketch is presented in Appendix A.
Preliminaries
We introduce some notation on error-correcting codes and reiterate the definition of a fuzzy sketch, along with two constructions that will be analyzed in Sections 4 and 5.
Error-Correcting Codes
, which is a k-dimensional linear subspace of the vector space F Let G be the generator matrix of a linear code C. For any linear code C an (n−k)×n parity check matrix H is defined that projects any vector v ∈ F n q on the space orthogonal to the code, i.e., the null space of G. This projection is called the syndrome and is denoted by syn(v). A word w ∈ F n q is an element of C iff syn(w) = 0, i.e., Hw = 0. When a codeword c is transmitted over a noisy channel, the received word w contains errors, i.e., w = c + e. Because of the linearity of C the syndrome of the received word equals the syndrome of the error, syn(w) = syn(e), which is used to determine the error vector e and perform decoding.
Let A q (n, d) be the maximum number of codewords in an arbitrary (n, K, d) Fq -code. An important bound 2 on A q (n, d) is the Singleton bound, which indicates a trade-off between the size of the code and its error-correcting capacity: 
Fuzzy Sketches
Dodis et al. [4] defined the concept of a secure sketch, which is a formalization of schemes that allow reconstruction of discrete noisy inputs with the help of public helper data, called the sketch, but remain minimally privacyinvasive. We briefly recall the definition of a sketch, closely following Boyen's notation [13] .
All logarithms in this definition and the remainder of the text are base 2, unless explicitly indicated otherwise. The min-entropy of a variable W is defined as The quantity L = m − m is called the entropy loss and indicates the amount of information that a sketch leaks about the input. It was shown in [11] and [12] that this entropy loss is unavoidable.
Permutation-Based Sketches.
A general technique was given in [4] to build sketches from transitive isometric permutations and error-correcting codes. The idea is the following; a randomly chosen permutation maps an input w onto a codeword c and other inputs w that are close to w in the vicinity of c. Let ∈ R denote "a uniformly random element of".
Definition 2. A permutation-based sketch is a fuzzy sketch
Fsk, Rec where
on input w and sketch P , with Dec the decoding procedure of C that maps π
The entropy-loss of a permutationbased sketch is L = log |Π| − log Γ − log K where Γ is defined as the minimum number of possible permutations that map w onto c, i.e., min w,c |{π | π[w] = c}| ≥ Γ.
Code-Offset Construction
An example of a family of transitive, isometric permutations in Hamming spaces is the set of all shifts π x (y) = y − x. A construction based on this permutation was presented by Juels and Wattenberg as the fuzzy commitment scheme [1] . We present it here as a fuzzy sketch. Let c ∈ R C. The code-offset sketch is defined as: 
Bit-Permutations
A bit-permutation is represented by a permutation matrix, which is obtained by permuting the rows of the n × n identity matrix I. A permutation matrix A P has full rank and it holds that A −1
Unfortunately, bit-permutations are not transitive and at first sight not suitable to construct a permutation-based sketch. However, we can make them transitive in spaces over F 2 by assuming that all inputs are balanced words, i.e., words that have an equal number of zeros and ones. This assumption introduces a (reasonable) constraint on the biometric model.
2 )-code, and A P a permutation matrix. The bit-permutation sketch is defined as:
Similarly, the use of constant-weight codes, i.e., codes where all codewords have constant weight s, was suggested in [4] to construct a sketch for the set difference metric in small universes. The entropy loss of this sketch is log n! − log s!(n−s)!−log K or log 
Security Notions
Before we analyze fuzzy sketches we need to formalize the properties that are required from a biometric template protection scheme and the scenarios in which they are used. Therefore, we define the minimal notions under which such a scheme must be secure.
Sketch Indistinguishability
The problem of using biometric data as identifier to link information from different applications suggests a notion of sketch indistinguishability. In cryptosystems, the notion of ciphertext indistinguishability means, informally, that no adversary has a significant advantage over random guessing to determine from a given ciphertext which element of a twoelement message space was encrypted. This is the property that is traditionally required from cryptosystems.
Bellare et al. [14] considered a new problem that relates to the privacy of the keys (or key owners) and introduced a new notion called indistuishability of keys. The notion is modeled as a game in which an adversary chooses a message and two public keys. He then receives the encryption of that message under one of the two keys and he has to guess which key was used. Additionally, the adversary can have access to decryption oracles for the two keys. In the context of biometrics the sketching function is a randomized procedure, like a probabilistic encryption function, that outputs sketches corresponding to specific biometric data, which can be considered as keys. However, the biometric data are considered entirely private. Therefore, the adversary does not have to indicate from which biometric a sketch originates, but he has to determine whether the sketches originate from the same biometric or not.
We define security notions for sketch indistinguishability through two games in which the adversary is modeled as a very weak adversary. He does not get to choose the biometric sources, nor does he get to perform additional queries on the sketching function or the recovery function. Yet, we will demonstrate that some constructions are insecure, even for this weak adversary.
3.1.1. Indistinguishability Game. In a first scenario we assume that an adversary holds a protected template, a sketch, for which he knows the person who corresponds to it. The adversary holds a second template, e.g., retrieved from a token, and wants to know if it corresponds to the same person.
Formally, let t ≥ 0 be the error-tolerance of a biometric system and let
be the set of perturbation functions that represents the possible differences between two related samples. Consider the following game between a challenger and the adversary.
1) The challenger selects a random variable W ∈ M and samples W to obtain w ∈ M, e.g., a fingerprint. The challenger produces a sketch P = Fsk(w) and gives P to the adversary. 2) The challenger flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1, the challenger selects δ ∈ R Δ| t and computes w = δ(w), e.g., a similar fingerprint. If b = 0, the challenger samples W to obtain w , e.g., a random fingerprint. A sketch P = Fsk(w ) is generated from w and given to the adversary. 3) The adversary outputs a single bitb ∈ {0, 1} and wins ifb = b. We call the adversary in the above game an Fsk-IND adversary and we define his advantage in the game as
The advantage and all other advantages in this section are scaled to lie between 0 and 1. For a biometric sketch to be reusable it should beindistinguishable with negligibly small. The game easily extends to a model where the adversary receives two or more related sketches in the first step.
N-Indistinguishability Game.
We now model the situation where biometric data are stored in a central database. An adversary has obtained a database of protected templates and wants to find the template, in the database, that is related to the one that he is holding. This specific situation models a profiling attack where the adversary tries to lookup records in a database by using a biometric template from another application as a key. The new game is based on the indistinguishability game and consists of the following steps.
1) The challenger performs step 1 of the indistinguishability game and gives the produced sketch P = Fsk(w) to the adversary. 2) The challenger chooses an integer k ∈ R {1, . . . , N} and produces a sequence of N sketches
The k-th sketch P k is generated from w k = δ(w), δ ∈ R Δ| t . The other sketches are generated from random samples of W . The challenger gives the sketches [P 1 , . . . , P N ] to the adversary. 3) The adversary outputs an integerk ∈ {1, . . . , N} and wins ifk = k. We call the adversary in the modified indistinguishability game an Fsk-IND-N adversary and we define his advantage in the game as
This advantage cannot be derived directly from the advantage of an Fsk-IND adversary because it depends on the attack strategy and on the size of the database N , e.g., see Section 4.2.2. To justify the storage of biometric data in a central database the templates should be protected with an (N, )-indistinguishable sketch, where N is the number of stored templates and is negligibly small. This implies that it is practically impossible to find a person's records in a database by using a biometric template as a key.
Sketch Irreversibility
Next to indistinguishability, the second and most important property of a biometric template protection scheme is that it irreversibly transforms biometric data, i.e., into a protected template from which the original data cannot be recovered but that still can be used for verification or identification. The irreversibility of fuzzy sketches has been studied by Boyen [13] in the setting where the same fuzzy sketch is applied multiple times on the same noisy input. To prevent distinguishability of the biometric input, which is not taken into account in [13] , one could argue to use different sketches for different applications. E.g., different error-correcting codes could be used in different applications in the hope that information that is leaked from the applications cannot be compared. We now consider irreversibility in this situation.
Irreversibility
Game. An adversary has multiple sketches that were generated from the same noisy input, but with different sketching functions and his goal is to recover the original input.
Formally, let Δ| t be the set of perturbation functions as defined in the indistinguishability game and let Φ = { Fsk i , Rec i } be a family of (M, m, m i , t i )-secure fuzzy sketches. Consider the following game between a challenger and the adversary.
1) The challenger selects a random variable W ∈ M and samples W to obtain w ∈ M. The challenger then selects a sketch Fsk 1 , Rec 1 ∈ R Φ , produces a sketch P = Fsk 1 (w) and gives P to the adversary. 2) The challenger selects δ ∈ R Δ| t , for t = min{t i } , and a sketch
The challenger generates a sketch P = Fsk 2 (w ) from w = δ(w) and gives P to the adversary. 3) The adversary outputs a wordŵ ∈ M and wins if w = w. Guessing w is equivalent to guessing w since w can always be recovered from w and P .
We call the adversary in the above game an Fsk-FOW (fuzzy sketch family one-wayness) adversary and we define his advantage in the game as
Because the sketches can only be reversed completely if they leak enough information, the adversary's advantage is bound by From this notion we can define a notion of irreversibility for a single sketch, which is similar to, but much weaker than Boyen's outsider security notion [13] . The adversary plays the irreversibility game with the difference that Fsk 2 = Fsk 1 . The adversary is called an Fsk-OW adversary and his advantage in the single-sketch irreversibility game is 
Distinguishability
In this section we apply the notions of sketch indistinguishability on the code-offset sketch and the bitpermutation sketch. These sketches permute or translate the underlying code to be able to perform error-correction around the original input. The permutation is specific to the input and is partially or indirectly leaked through the sketch. If enough information is leaked we expect to be able to compare the "permutations" of two sketches and to determine if they are related or not.
We demonstrate for both constructions that the adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the indistinguishability game and the N-indistinguishability game. These advantages are then expressed in terms of a generalized heuristic and a necessary condition for perfect indistinguishability is derived from a lower bound on Adv ind that holds for any sketch that has uniform input.
Code-Offset Sketches
We present an attack strategy for the indistinguishability and the N-indistinguishability game where the sketches are produced by a (linear) code-offset sketch. Bounds on the adversary's advantage are derived from bounds in coding theory and it is shown that this advantage is non-negligible. 
and the adversary's advantage is
For a uniform W , the probability that v is decodable, given that w 1 and w 2 are not related, equals the probability that a random word w ∈ R F n q is decodable. Let V q (n, r) = r i=0 n i (q − 1)
i be the number of vectors in a sphere with radius r in F n q . The decodability probability of w is
In practice, the advantage will be slightly worse because biometrics have a false acceptance rate and thus they are not truely uniform. However, if the false acceptance rate is too high, the biometric modality is not usable. We define the following quantity as a quality measure for the indistinguishability of a code-offset sketch based on a particular code.
Definition 7. The distinguishing information leakage Λ of an [n, k, d] Fq -code in the code-offset construction is given by
hence,
We conclude that the adversary's advantage grows rapidly with the increasing distinguishing information leakage of the code that was used to generate the code-offset sketches in the indistinguishability game. The distinguishing information leakage, and thus also the advantage, is 0 for perfect codes, since q k V q (n, t)=q n . For q = 2 we have
with L the entropy loss of the sketch and h 2 the binary entropy function (see Equation (2) below).
The term n − k in the distinguishing information leakage, i.e., the entropy loss of the sketch, indicates the number of bits that is leaked about the input. These bits are available to the adversary in the form of parity checks in the syndrome of the offset. Because of the linearity of the code it is easy to compare the syndromes of different offsets and thus the original inputs.
Adversary Advantage Bounds.
A good code-offset sketch uses a code that has a small distinguishing information leakage such that the advantage of an Fsk-IND adversary is negligible. We are interested in the smallest distinguishing information leakage for which there exists an [n, k, d] Fq -code and we denote this quantity with Λ q (n, d). This problem relates directly to the main problem in coding theory, i.e., given the length of the code and the desired minimum distance, what is the best dimension (or rate) that can be achieved. By definition
To be able to deal with the quantity log q V q (n,
) we introduce the following asymptotic definition, which will allow us to approximate the advantage of an Fsk-IND adversary and to determine bounds on this advantage by using asymptotic bounds on α q (δ).
Definition 8. The smallest relative distinguishing information leakage of infinitely long (linear) codes with relative minimum distance δ in the code-offset construction is defined as
and
Let H q denote the q-ary entropy function such that for
and H q (0) = 0 . This function allows us to express λ q (δ) in a form that is easier to work with.
Lemma 1. For
Proof: Let τ = tn −1 be the relative error-correcting capacity. It holds that
. We now apply bounds from coding theory to define upper and lower bounds on λ q (δ), which will reveal what the best is we can hope for regarding the indistinguishability of linear code-offset sketches.
Two upper bounds on α q (δ) were defined by McEliece et al. [18] , which we will refer to as the MMRW bounds, following the notation in [17] . Let 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 − q −1 . The first MRRW bound gives us
The second MMRW bound is better than the first but only valid for q = 2.
Proof: The result follows from Lemma 1 and the MMRW bounds.
A lower bound on B q (n, d) was given by Gilbert [19] , [17] and yields an upper bound on λ q (δ).
The result follows from Definition 8. Given the bounds on λ q (δ) we bind the adversary's advantage.
Proposition 4. For
Proof: The proof follows from Definition 8 and Lemmas 2 and 3. Figure 1 shows the bounds on λ 2 (δ). Figure 2 shows the bounds on the advantage of an Fsk-IND adversary observing sketches produced by a binary linear code of length n = 100. The bounds are computed from Proposition 4. For d = 7 the advantage is 0.54. This means that if the maximum allowed distance between two related samples is 3 bits, which is very small (see examples in Section 4.1.4), then the adversary will, on average, win the indistinguishability game 3 out of 4 times. We conclude that an Fsk-IND adversary has a nonnegligible advantage when observing code-offset sketches produced with linear codes. This means that an adversary can easily identify protected templates originating from the same person. The bounds can be improved by applying list decoding (see Appendix A), but the advantage remains substantial (see Figure 2) . 
N-Indistinguishability
Game.
In the Nindistinguishability game the adversary obtains N sketches, [P 1 , . . . , P N ], of which the k-th sketch (P k ) is related to the sketch he is already holding. The adversary's goal is to guess the value k.
A simple strategy is to play the indistinguishability game on each sketch P j , j = {1, . . . , N}, and to select all the sketches that appear to be related based on the decodability of the code-offset difference. The k-th sketch is related and will always be selected. Of the N − 1 remaining sketches, q −Λ (N − 1) sketches produce a decodable offset difference and will also be selected. From this selection the adversary chooses one sketch and outputs its index j as his guess in the N-indistinguishability game. The probability of making a correct guess is
and the advantage of an Fsk-IND-N adversary using this strategy is
From the term q −Λ N it can be seen that increasing the size of the database hardly reduces the adversary's advantage, unless the order of magnitude of the size is q Λ . Again, the adversary advantage increases rapidly with an increasing Λ. For Λ = 0 all sketches in the database will be selected and the advantage is 0, when using this strategy. 
Bit-Permutations Sketches
We present an attack strategy to distinguish sketches that are produced by a bit-permutation sketch in the model where related sketches are generated from the same sample. The strategy can be extended to deal with sketches generated from similar, but non-equal samples, however, the complexity increases exponentially with the dimension of the underlying code. Let 
Let D denote the dimension of the intersection of V 1 and V 2 . An Fsk-IND adversary will take the value of D as a heuristic for guessing the coin flip b in the indistinguishability game. He computes the conditional distribution on b given D as
and outputs the value of b (1 or 0) with highest conditional probability as his guess. The conditional distribution on D given b depends on the structure of the code. If this distribution cannot be derived analytically, it can be estimated from simulations, e.g., using Monte Carlo methods. The probability of making a correct guess is
In the model where w 1 = w 2 but d(w 1 , w 2 ) ≤ t the adversary will count the number of points in V 2 that are at most distance t from a point in V 1 and use this a heuristic instead of D. This is equivalent to verifying 2 k times that a point is decodable in V 1 .
N-Indistinguishability Game.
Analogously to the N-indistinguishability game for code-offset sketches, the adversary will apply the attack strategy of the indistinguishability game for bit-permutations sketches on each of the N sketches [P 1 , . . . , P N ] to make a selection of potentially related sketches. From this selection the adversary will choose one and output its index as a guess for k.
The adversary uses again D as a heuristic and selects the sketch
In the attack strategy for the code-offset construction the adversary always selects P k . However, the strategy for the bit-permutation sketch allows only a probabilistic guess and there is no guarantee that P k will be selected. Furthermore, to have an advantage over random guessing in this game, the adversary needs probabilities
. Otherwise, the adversary will not select any sketch as being potentially related. This allows us to determine bounds on N for which an Fsk-IND-N adversary still selects sketches.
The distribution 
2 } . The probability that the related sketch is among the selected sketches is
The number of sketches that is selected as possibly related is N i∈I Pr[D = i] . The probability of correctly guessing k is
Example.
Let C be a first-order Reed-Muller code of length n = 128 without the codewords 0 and 1, i.e., C = RM (1, 7)\{(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}. The code contains 2 8 − 2 codewords of weight n/2. Table 1 gives the proba-
Note that D is never 0 because the intersection will always contain 0 and 1, which we expunged from the full RM (1, 7) code. Appendix B explains how to compute the intersection probabilities for this particular sketch. Table 1 . Conditional probabilities on the size of the intersection V 1 ∩ V 2 and bounds on N for a bit-permutation sketch based on RM (1, 7) . The advantage of an Fsk-IND adversary is
The bounds for which an Fsk-IND-N adversary still selects sketches are also given in Table 1 . If we take N = 2 20 then I = {2, 3, . . . , 8} and
Perfect Indistinguishability
It was proved by Smith [11] that a fuzzy sketch must always leak information about its input: "If a sketch Fsk corrects t errors and E is a uniform distribution over {v | v ≤ t} then for any distribution W we have
." We will use this observation on the information leakage of a sketch and generalize the results from the previous sections to derive a lower bound on Adv ind and thus a necessary condition for fuzzy sketches to be perfectly indistinguishable.
Generalized Heuristic.
First we describe adversary advantages in terms of a generalized heuristic H with range H, which is a generalization of the attack strategy for bitpermutation sketches. Let H : {0, 1}
* × {0, 1} * → H be a deterministic function that takes as input two sketches, produced with the same sketching function Fsk, and that outputs an element of H. Without loss of generality we assume H to be discrete. We denote the conditional distribution on H given that the input sketches are related as f H|r1 and as f H|r0 if the sketches are unrelated. The advantages of an Fsk-IND adversary and an Fsk-IND-N adversary are
where 
An example of such a binary heuristic is the decodability heuristic in the code-offset construction. Note that if a binary heuristic selects on one value (h 1 ) it will not select on the other value (h 0 ).
Recovery Range
Overlap. An example of a binary heuristic for sketches is a function that verifies whether the range of the recovery function Rec for a given sketch overlaps with that of another sketch. This is equivalent to verifying the decodability of the subtracted code offsets in Section 4.1.
For a given sketch generated from w we denote the recovery range by R w = Range(Rec(., Fsk(w))) and the extended recovery range as R E w , i.e., all points in R w and the points that are at most distance t from those points. The distinguishability of sketches P a = Fsk(a) and P b = Fsk(b) depends on their recovery ranges R a and R b . If the sketches are related then there is at least one point in the intersection R E a ∩ R b . If the intersection is empty then the sketches are not related. See Figure 3 for a visual representation of the recovery ranges of two unrelated sketches. It is reasonable to assume that the adversary knows the recovery function and that he is able to determine whether R b overlaps with R E a or not. The probability of having overlap depends on the structure of the recovery ranges, but a necessary condition is that at least one point in R b lies in R E a . Let h 1 denote that the (extended) recovery ranges of two given sketches overlap, then
It is clear that 0-indistinguishability can only be achieved if two (extended) recovery ranges always overlap completely, irrespective of the sketches being related or not. In the code-offset sketch and the bit-permutation sketch this means that the underlying code must be perfect. Unfortunately, there are only few perfect codes and they have small error-correcting capacity [20] , except for repetition codes, but these have dimension 1.
Given the attack based on the overlap heuristic we derive the following lower bounds on the advantages of an Fsk-IND and an Fsk-IND-N adversary. 
Proof: Using the attack strategy with the overlap heuristic, the result follows immediately from Equations (7), (8) and (9) .
We can now define these bounds in terms of the information that is leaked by a sketch to determine a necessary condition for perfect indistinguishability that holds for any type of fuzzy sketch. 
Corollary 6. Let
Since I(X; Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ), this gives us the lower bound on Adv ind .
We conclude that if a sketch leaks more information about it's input than needed to correct the errors, then this extra leakage can be used to distinguish related sketches from unrelated sketches.
Reversibility
The previous section dealt with the problem of identifying related sketches. In this section we reconsider the desired irreversibility property of biometric sketches. We apply the notions of sketch irreversibility on the code-offset sketch and the bit-permutation sketch and we demonstrate how an adversary can combine the information that is leaked from two related sketches to learn more about the original input than he would learn from a single sketch.
Related Code-Offset Sketches
We consider sketches that are produced by different sketching functions from a family of code-offset sketches based on linear codes and we derive a necessary condition for this family to be perfectly irreversible. 
respectively. The adversary's goal in this game is to guess w 1 (or equivalently w 2 ). We assume that both codes have length n = n 1 = n 2 .
then the adversary will try to solve the linear system of equations
From x 1 the adversary can compute c 1 and thus w 1 . The system has a unique solution if the sketches leak enough information, i.e., 
, then the system of equations has no solution. However, an adversary can iterate over all possible error patterns e and check if the system
is solvable by verifying that
Unfortunately, the number of error patterns to check becomes large if t is large, since #{e | e ≤ t} ≈ 2 nh2( t n ) . 
This leads us to the following necessary condition for perfect irreversibility of a family of code-offset sketches based on linear codes. 
Proof: Given the attack strategy above, the result follows from Equation (12) .
This implies that for any pair of codes, corresponding to two sketches from a family of sketches that is perfectly irreversible, one of the codes must be a subcode of the other. Because the BCH-code is shorter, we assume that the first bit from the sample is punctured, which is equivalent to extending the generator matrix of the BCH-code by prepending it with a column of zeroes. LetĜ BCH be this extended generator matrix, then we have that
Following Equation (12) the adversary's advantage is 1 and any two offset sketches produced with these codes can be completely reversed.
Related Bit-Permutation Sketches
The adversary plays the irreversibility game for a single bit-permutation sketch. He receives two sketches P 1 = A 1 , h(c 1 ) and P 2 = A 2 , h(c 2 ) , as in the indistinguishability game in Section 4.2, with the additional constraint that the sketches are related. Again, we limit the scope to the model in which related sketches are generated from the same sample w. The adversary's goal is to guess w.
The attack strategy is straightforward and follows from the results in Section 4.2. The adversary will look at the intersection of V 1 and V 2 and will randomly choose an element from that intersection as a guess for w. The probability of guessing correctly is
In the example of Section 4. 
Conclusion and Future Work
We have studied the two main properties, indistinguishability and irreversibility, of biometric template protection schemes in the model where the schemes are applied multiple times on the same noisy input. For these properties, security notions were defined that model a weak adversary and we have demonstrated that several constructions based on linear error-correcting codes are not secure under these notions. We have determined necessary conditions for perfect indistinguishability and perfect irreversibility from bounds on the adversary's advantages. A natural question is whether we can transpose our results to schemes that work with continuous sources, where quantization is used as errorcorrection, and models in which we take into account nonuniform error patterns.
errors where d is the minimum distance of the code. Given a word that was received after transmitting a codeword over a noisy channel, a list decoding algorithm outputs a list of codewords that are at most distance e from the received word and decoding is considered successful if the original word is in the list. For biometric authentication based on sketches, this only works if a verification value is available against which the codewords on the list can be tested, e.g., the hash of the codeword.
List decoding allows decoding beyond half the minimum distance of a code. Obviously, the size of the list increases with e. Guruswami [22] determined the following bound on the list decoding radius e. If then the number of codewords returned by a list decoding algorithms is at most 2n. Efficient constructions on list decoding algorithms for several types of codes were given in [22] . We can improve our bounds on the distinguishing information leakage of a code (see Section 4.1) by using a code that has a minimum distance d < 2e + 1 with e the desired noise-tolerance of the sketch. The noise-tolerance stays the same, e = t, but we can have more codewords (and a larger recovery range R w , see Section 4.3), thus the entropy loss n − k decreases, while V q (n, e) and the extensions around the elements of R w remain the same. . Because the bound is tight we can replace the term H 2 ( δ 2 ) in the bounds on the relative distinguishing information leakage of a binary code-offset sketch in Proposition 4 with H 2 (J(δ)). The improved bounds on the distinguishing information leakage and the advantage of an Fsk-IND adversary are shown in Figures 1 and 2 . Unfortunately, the adversary still has a significant advantage.
Appendix B. Intersection Probabilities
In this section we show how to compute the intersection probabilities as defined in Section 4. To compute the probability that the dimension of the intersection is k − 1 we have have to add the probabilities that any of the basis vectors is not in V 2 , or 
